Is Looting Ever Justified?: An Analysis of Looting Laws and the Applicability of the Necessity Defense During Natural Disasters and States of Emergency by Hamrick, Stephanie J.
Is LOOTING EVER JUSTIFIED?: AN
ANALYSIS OF LOOTING LAWS AND THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE NECESSITY
DEFENSE DURING NATURAL DISASTERS
AND STATES OF EMERGENCY
Stephanie J. Hamrick*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2005 Atlantic hurricane season was inarguably one of the most
destructive and active storm seasons in recent history, pummeling both entire
states and long-standing storm records.' Not only did the Atlantic experience a
record of fifteen hurricanes, but the region also saw a record of four category
five hurricanes. 2 Three of those category five hurricanes - Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma - made landfall on the United States.3 Hurricane Katrina set a record as
the costliest hurricane in U.S. history, and the hurricane season as a whole was
the costliest on U.S. record.4
While many watched their television sets in awe as these powerful hurri-
canes ripped through the Gulf Coast states, those living in the region had their
lives uprooted. The severe warnings of the impending hurricanes required most
residents to flee to safety. However, many stayed. 5 For those who did, particu-
larly residents of Mississippi and Louisiana, during Hurricane Katrina, survival
took on a new level of meaning as the basic necessities of life, usually taken for
granted, were stripped away.
Take for instance Monica Laguard, a mother left behind in New Orleans to
fend for herself and her children after Hurricane Katrina. She was seen three
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2007. This Note won the NEVADA
LAW JOURNAL'S prestigious 2006 Carl W. Tobias Excellence in Writing award.
1 Ken Kaye, Biggest, Costliest Hurricane Season Yet, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 30,
2005, at Al.
2 Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Reviews Record-Setting 2005 Atlantic Hur-
ricane Season, Nov. 29, 2005 (updated Apr. 13, 2006), http:www.noaanews.noaa.gov/sto-
ries2005/s2540.htm.
I Id.
4 John Pain, Costliest Season of Hurricanes Ends, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 30, 2005, at A6
(indicating that Hurricane Katrina amassed $34.4 billion in insured losses and the storm
season as a whole resulted in $47.2 billion in insured losses, while total estimates to rebuild
the devastated areas approach $200 billion).
5 Despite a mandatory evacuation ordered for New Orleans, the mayor estimated that 50,000
- 100,000 of the city's 485,000 residents remained, enduring the wrath of the storm. A City
Weeps, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 1, 2005, at Al.
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days after the hurricane, taking children's clothes and food from a local store.6
As she sobbed uncontrollably, she simply stated that she needed to return to her
children at a local school shelter.'
Consider also Terry Hayes, who declared himself a "proud looter" less
than a week after Hurricane Katrina struck.8 He bragged of taking food, water,
and ice from local stores and hotels so that he could hand out supplies to the
many stranded people staying at the New Orleans Convention Center.9 He
touted that he had provided more help than local officials, and he planned to
continue to scavenge for items to relieve the suffering.'
Finally, take a look at Terry Dantoni and Yvonne Lee, who were found at
a New Orleans pharmacy three days after the hurricane wreaked its havoc on
the city." Officials discovered them loading up garbage bags full of pills, and
after further investigation, discovered that they had gathered nearly 38,000
pills.' 2 They, unlike Monica Laguard and Terry Hayes, were arrested for loot-
ing,' 3 despite the fact that all four of these people committed the crime of
looting as declared by Louisiana statute.' 4
What is society to do with individuals such as these? Do we hold them
accountable for their acts of looting' 5 and prosecute them accordingly? Do we
hope for a "forgiving silence" on the part of law enforcement agents who will
sympathetically turn a blind eye to their illegal acts? 16 Or do we offer them a
legitimate defense to their criminal acts, condoning their behavior as a neces-
sary evil that they were justified in pursuing given the extraordinary situation
they were in?' 7
Opinions on the matter vary widely. While some advocate holding looters
accountable to the extent of the law regardless of the items taken and the sur-
6 Erin McClam, What About a Case for Justifiable Looting?, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, Sept. 2, 2005, at A5.
7 Id.
8 Brian Thevenot, Proud Looter Took a Moment to Brag, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orle-
ans), Nov. 18, 2005, at Metro 7.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Michelle Hunter, Police Recover 58,000 Pills, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Nov. 4, 2005, at Metro 1.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 "Looting is the intentional entry by a person without authorization into any dwelling or
other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode
by a person, or any structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a place of
business, or any vehicle, watercraft, building, plant, establishment, or other structure, mova-
ble or immovable, in which normal security of property is not present by virtue of a hurri-
cane, flood, fire, act of God, or force majeure of any kind, or by virtue of a riot, mob, or
other human agency, and the obtaining or exerting control over or damaging or removing
property of the owner." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:62.5(A) (Supp. 2006).
15 See discussion infra section III.A.
16 See discussion infra section III.C.
17 See discussion infra section IV.C.
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rounding circumstances, 8 others are more sympathetic and recognize the
extreme need precipitating such acts. 19
The law, however, is silent on the subject. Though the defense of neces-
sity is available to criminal defendants in cases where a criminal act is commit-
ted to avoid a greater evil,2° the defense has never been applied to looting
charges.21 Indeed, the crime of looting is a relatively rare one that exists in
only six states, including Louisiana and Mississippi.22 The absence of case law
regarding how the defense might apply to a looting charge is now critical, con-
sidering the sheer number of individuals who are charged with looting in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina.23
This Note advocates a principled approach to applying the necessity
defense to crimes of looting. Section II outlines the contours of the necessity
defense, defining its various elements and discussing the situations and crimes
to which it has traditionally been applied. Section III catalogues the crime of
looting, with particular emphasis on the lack of case law regarding criminal
looting charges and the role that discretionary enforcement plays in this
absence. Section IV offers an analysis of how the necessity defense could be
invoked by one charged with looting, with suggestions regarding how the
defense could be applied in a sound, limited fashion, restricting it to only those
who can demonstrate true need in the wake of a state of emergency. Section V
concludes with recommendations for making the necessity defense available to
those charged with looting, rather than relying exclusively on discretionary
enforcement of the law to protect those like Monica Laguard and Terry Hayes
who might find themselves charged as criminal defendants.
II. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
Criminal law recognizes that there are limited occasions where an actor's
otherwise criminal conduct should go unpunished. In response to these situa-
tions, the law has developed a variety of defenses available to criminal defend-
ants, including the necessity defense.24
11 "Looting is looting" and "won't be tolerated." Michael Perlstein, Looter Patrol to Crack
Down in New Orleans, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 18, 2005, at Metro 1.
19 The former New Orleans police chief said that law enforcement would tolerate people
taking "food and water, and that's because of the necessity of survival." Carlos Campos &
Rhonda Cook, Katrina: The Aftermath: Looting, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 1, 2005, at
B3.
20 See discussion infra section II.
21 See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
23 As of February 7, 2006, 335 looting arrests had been made in New Orleans. Paul Pur-
pura, 'Survival' Looters Get Leniency from DA, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb.
7, 2006, at 1. Over 150 looting arrests had been made in two Mississippi cities just over a
month after Hurricane Katrina hit. Chris Hamilton, Looting Can Shake Confidence in
Humanity, SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Oct. 10, 2005, at A7.
24 James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, "Choice of Evils," Necessity, Duress, or Similar
Defense to State or Local Criminal Charges Based on Acts of Public Protest, 3 A.L.R.5th
521 § 2(a) (2004).
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Stated simply, the necessity defense justifies25 criminal conduct when the
actor is faced with a "choice of evils' 26 and chooses the lesser of two evils by
breaking the law. The circumstance giving rise to the "choice of evils" must
originate from natural forces rather than human force.2 7 Duress, a closely
related defense, applies to similar situations where the threat arises from human
force.28 Because the two defenses are so similar, "[m]odem cases have tended
to blur the distinction between duress and necessity."'29 This Note will discuss
only the defense of necessity, since that is the appropriate defense when looting
occurs in the wake of a natural disaster.
A. Elements of the Necessity Defense
Necessity is an affirmative defense 30 that requires the defendant to first
admit to committing the elements of the offense3 ' and then present evidence
regarding why the necessity defense should apply.3 2 If the judge determines
that the defendant cannot prove the elements of the necessity defense as a mat-
ter of law, the defendant is not allowed to present the defense to the trier of
fact. 33 Thus, without substantial evidence in support of each element of the
necessity defense, the trier of fact will be barred from considering the defense
at trial.
While the enumeration of necessity defense elements varies depending on
the jurisdiction,34 the typical necessity defense involves four basic ideas: (1)
25 Criminal defenses may fall into the general categories of "justification" or "excuse."
While similar, the distinction rests in whether society would encourage the criminal behavior
given the circumstances. If society would permit or tolerate the otherwise criminal act, the
actor is justified in committing the act. Common justification defenses are necessity, self-
defense and defense of others. Excuses, on the other hand, occur where society would assign
blame to the actor's conduct rather than to the actor, thereby excusing the unjustified con-
duct. Common excuses include insanity, involuntary intoxication, and mistake. Joshua
Dressler, Exegis of the Law of Duress: Justiftying the Excuse and Searching for its Proper
Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1349 n.124 (1989).
26 The necessity defense is often referred to as a "choice of evils" because it involves scena-
rios where the actor must choose between violating the law or enduring a greater harm by
complying with the law. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(a), at 477 (3d ed. 2000).
27 LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(a), at 476.
28 See id. § 5.4(a), at 276-277; Dressier, supra note 25, at 1347-48.
29 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410.
30 21 AM. JUR. 2 D Criminal Law § 159 (1998).
31 Shaun P. Martin, The Radical Necessity Defense, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1527, 1527 (2005).
32 21 AM. JUR. 2 D Criminal Law § 159, supra note 30.
33 See People v. Kratovil, 815 N.E.2d 78, 90 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (a jury instruction on
necessity "is not warranted if the evidence before the trial court is so clear and convincing
that the court finds the affirmative defense unavailable as a matter of law"); State v. Recard,
704 So. 2d 324, 327, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (trial court is vested with wide discretion to
determine relevant evidence, and evidence irrelevant to a necessity defense is properly
excluded from the jury); McMillan v. City of Jackson, 701 So. 2d 1105, 1108 (Miss. 1997)
(trial court does not need to consider a defense which is unsupported by evidence); State v.
Hudgkins, 606 S.E.2d 443, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (judge must give jury instructions
regarding a criminal defense if the judge determines there is sufficient evidence to support
each element of the defense as a matter of law).
3 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (West 2005) (must avoid an imminent harm
occurring through no fault of the defendant, where the benefits of avoiding injury clearly
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the defendant must have committed the illegal act to avoid a significant harm;
(2) the defendant must have reasonably believed that the illegal act was neces-
sary to avoid the potential harm; (3) there must not have been any reasonable
alternatives available to avoid the harm; and (4) the harm inflicted by breaking
the law must be less than the harm avoided by obeying the law.3 5 Many juris-
dictions impose the additional requirements that the threatened harm was immi-
nent" and that the defendant was not responsible for causing the situation
where the "choice of evils" became necessary.3 7 Although the elements are
significantly interrelated, they will each be discussed separately below.
1. The Illegal Act Was Committed to Avoid Significant Harm
The "harm avoided" test is quite broad, and encompasses a number of
potential harms. The harm avoided can be either physical harm or harm to
outweigh the desirability of following the law); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-302 (2003) (must
avoid imminent harm which is greater than that avoided by following the law, where the
defense is not excluded by law or legislative purpose and the defendant was not reckless or
negligent in bringing about the situation); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-13 (West 2002)
(defendant must be without blame in causing the situation and must have reasonably
believed his action was necessary to avoid a public or private injury); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17A § 103 (1983) (must avoid imminent harm, and defendant must have believed action
taken prevented a larger harm than following the statute); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (West
1999) (must avoid imminent harm, defendant must not have caused the situation, and the
harm avoided is less than the harm sought to be prevented by law); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
2-212 (2005) (defendant acted to avoid reasonably certain imminent death or serious bodily
harm); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1996) (defendant must have acted to prevent harm
which would have been greater than the harm sought to be prevented by statute, but defense
not available if defendant was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2004) (defendant must act to avoid imminent harm, must
not bring about the situation, and the harm avoided is less than the harm sought to be pre-
vented by law); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.200 (West 2003) (defendant must avoid immi-
nent harm which would be greater than the harm inflicted by violating the law); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-11-609 (2003) (defendant acted to avoid imminent harm, and the need to avoid
harm is clearly outweighed by the harm the statute sought to prevent); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.47 (West 2005) (defendant acted to avoid imminent public disaster, death, or great
bodily harm); Cleveland v. Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Alaska 1981) ("1) The act
charged must have been done to prevent a significant evil; 2) there must have been no
adequate alternative; 3) the harm caused must not have been disproportionate to the harm
avoided."); State v. Hastings, 801 P.2d 563, 564 (Idaho 1990) (defense requires threat of
immediate harm where defendant is blameless in bringing about the situation, there were no
less offensive alternatives available, and the harm caused was not disproportionate to the
harm avoided.); Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 957-58 (Mass. 1998) (defendant
acts to avoid imminent harm, reasonably believes his action will avoid harm, no legal alter-
natives exist, and the defense has not been precluded by the legislature); State v. Owen, 693
A.2d 670, 672 (R.I. 1997) (defendant did not meet the necessity defense requirements that he
was confronted with a personal danger, and no legal alternatives were available); State v.
Cole, 403 S.E.2d 117, 119 (S.C. 1991) (defendant was faced with imminent danger of death
or serious bodily harm through no fault of his own, and there are no legal alternatives); State
v. Rome, 452 N.W.2d 790, 792 (S.D. 1990) (defendant had "reasonable fear of death or
bodily harm so imminent ... that ... the desirability of avoiding the injury outweighs the
desirability of avoiding the public injury arising from the offense committed") (quoting State
v. Miller, 313 N.W.2d 460, 462 (S.D. 1981)).
35 See Martin, supra note 31, at 1535-36.
36 See id. at 1567; LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(d), at 484.
3' LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(d), at 486.
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property, and it can be potential harm to the defendant or to another person the
defendant sought to protect.38 Moreover, the criminal act must have been com-
mitted specifically to avoid the threatened harm; mere accidental, unforeseeable
avoidance of harm through a criminal act will not qualify.39
One harm that has been specifically excluded from the list of recognizable
harms a defendant may seek to prevent is economic harm.4' The seminal case
declaring this policy, State v. Moe ,4 involved a Depression-era raid on a gro-
cery store. 42 The offenders were a group of unemployed people who demanded
that the chairman of a local commissary increase their flour allowance.4 3
When their request was denied, they entered a local store and proceeded to take
groceries without paying. 44 The individuals were convicted of grand larceny
and riot45 but argued they should have been allowed to present evidence related
to their economic conditions at the time of the riot to justify the behavior.4 6
The court saw no merit in the argument, since economic necessity was not a
recognized criminal defense. 47 To allow the defense in such a case "would
leave to the individual the right to take the law into his own hands."48 A later
court added a more concrete gloss to this rationale, declaring that to allow an
economic necessity defense would encourage all those who experienced finan-
cial troubles to steal.4 9
The necessity defense can be criticized based on this element alone, since
obeying the law is in itself a higher goal that many believe should always be
adhered to no matter the circumstance.50 Some argue that if one had the ability
to conform to the law, moral culpability should hold him responsible for viola-
tion regardless of the reason.5 ' Fortunately, the necessity defense does not rely
on this element alone, so such a stringent analysis does not end the inquiry into
whether the necessity defense applies to a particular defendant.
38 Id. at 481-82.
39 Id. at 482.
40 Martin, supra note 31, at 1588. The economic necessity defense, while generally unrec-
ognized as a criminal defense, is sometimes disallowed because the defendant cannot prove
other elements of the defense, such as imminent threat of harm or lack of legal alternatives.
See People v. Fontes, 89 P.3d 484, 486 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (denying the necessity defense
to a man who attempted to cash a forged check in order to provide food for his three children
with serious health problems, where he could have obtained food elsewhere and where the
threat to his children's health was not sufficiently imminent). Despite case law, some com-
mentators argue that theft of food is justified if necessary to avoid starvation. See Martin,
supra note 31, at 1558; John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and
the Rule of Law, 36 Hous. L. REv. 397, 398 (1999).
41 24 P.2d 638 (Wash. 1933).
42 Id. at 639.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 638.
46 Id. at 639-40.
47 Id. at 640.
48 Id.
49 State v. Ratliff, No. 1873, 1991 WL 110257 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20, 1991) (denying the
necessity defense to a woman convicted of accepting welfare checks while simultaneously
working).
50 See Parry, supra note 40, at 421.
51 Id.
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2. The Defendant Reasonably Believed the Illegal Act Was Necessary
to Avoid the Potential Harm
This element is often described as the causation element, requiring the
defendant to demonstrate that the illegal act was committed in reasonable antic-
ipation that a greater harm would be avoided.5 2 In this regard, the defendant's
intention to avoid harm plays a critical role in this inquiry. However, regard-
less of the defendant's subjective intention to avoid harm, if the trier of fact
objectively determines that such illegal conduct could not reasonably result in
the avoidance of the harm, the necessity defense will fail. 3
3. No Reasonable Alternatives Were Available
This is perhaps the keystone element of the necessity defense, as the
Supreme Court has declared that "[u]nder any definition of [necessity] one
principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to vio-
lating the law . . . the defense[] will fail."54 Many attempts to invoke the
necessity defense fail on this element, since courts can usually identify a num-
ber of judicially appropriate alternatives that would have enabled the defendant
to avoid the potential harm without committing criminal behavior.55
Examples of "reasonable alternatives" are prolific throughout the law. A
man who brings whisky to church to treat his wife in case she has heart trouble
- on doctor's orders - is guilty of violating a law prohibiting liquor in churches
because he and his wife had the option of staying home.5 6 One who drives
while intoxicated to rush another to the hospital is not justified in doing so
when sober individuals are available to drive.57 A woman cannot abscond with
her child in violation of a custody order to protect the child from sexual assault
when the woman could refer the matter to social services or to the courts. 58 A
person is not justified in using marijuana to treat glaucoma when laser surgery
or medicated eyedrops are viable options to alleviate the pain. 59 A felon in
possession of a firearm during rampant looting cannot claim the necessity
defense because he had the option of staying home or seeking the help of
neighbors to protect himself.6 ° A bail runner cannot bring a gun on school
grounds in pursuit of fugitive when he could leave the gun safely off-campus or
notify the police.6 ' A political protestor cannot invoke the necessity defense
because "legal alternatives will never be deemed exhausted when the harm can
be mitigated by congressional action."6 2
Given the voluminous legal alternatives which courts can opine on after
the defendant has acted, rarely will an illegal act be deemed necessary and
52 See Martin, supra note 31, at 1579.
53 See id. at 1580; see also LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(d), at 482-83.
14 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
51 See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
56 Bice v. State, 34 S.E. 202, 203 (Ga. 1899).
57 Stodghill v. State, 892 So. 2d 236, 239 (Miss. 2005).
58 State v. W.M.S., 465 S.E.2d 580, 583 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
19 People v. Kratovil, 815 N.E.2d 78, 89 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
6 United States v. Carter, No 92-50557, 1993 WL 339762, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1993).
61 State v. Haskins, 585 S.E.2d 766, 771 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
62 United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1992).
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without alternatives. Indeed, this is an often cited failed element in civil diso-
bedience cases where defendants attempt to invoke the necessity defense to
justify criminal behavior in efforts to stop governmental harms. 6 3
4. The Harm Inflicted by Breaking the Law Was Less Than the Harm
Avoided by Obeying the Law
This element encapsulates the heart of the "choice of evils" dilemma.64 It
envisions a situation in which a person must either obey the law but suffer great
harm, or break the law and thereby avoid the harm.65 Faced with such a situa-
tion, we presume that society prefers that the person break the law to avoid the
greater harm.66
The inherent difficulty with this element is the fact that it requires a person
to weigh the evils of two options with little evaluative measures.6 7 First, it is
arguably difficult to define what might constitute "harm."6 8 Such an effort
inevitably involves subjective opinions that are not uniformly held within soci-
ety. 69 An act declared a crime by a legislature would qualify as a harm,
although that logic requires society to accept legislators' and judges' determi-
nations of harms.7 ° In the absence of legislative or judicial determination,
whether a particular harm qualifies as a "harm" under the necessity defense
remains elusive. 7 '
Second, even if society could agree on a universal list of harms, when a
person is faced with two competing harms, subjective opinions will again differ
regarding which is the lesser harm.7 2 Sometimes one harm will clearly be
greater than the other,7 3 but more often than not, the valuation of harms will be
unclear. In those cases, normative social values generally dominate 74 in deter-
mining whether the defendant acted improperly by violating the law, erasing
any consideration of the exigencies of the moment.
63 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
64 Indeed, it is the primary and practically sole requirement under the Model Penal Code,
which justifies an otherwise criminal act if
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) neither the Code nor other law defin-
ing the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
The Model Penal Code also negates the defense if the defendant was "reckless or negligent
in bringing about the situation." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962).
65 LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(a), at 483.
66 See id. at 477.
67 Parry, supra note 40, at 415.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 416.
70 Id. at 415-16.
71 Id. at 415.
72 Id. at 416.
71 See LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(c), at 479-480, for examples of such clear winners
(sailors refusing to obey a captain at sea so that the captain will return the unseaworthy
vessel to port for repairs, a parent violating mandatory school attendance laws due to a
child's feeble health, an ambulance driver violating speeding laws to race a patient to the
hospital, a police officer violating gambling laws in order to arrest a gambler, among others).
14 See Parry, supra note 40, at 420.
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The classic example of this moral debate can be found in two shipwreck
cases,7 5 one arising in England 76 and the other adjudicated by the American
courts.77 In both cases, the survivors of tragic shipwrecks were floating at sea,
uncertain of rescue, and eventually sacrificed some survivors to save the
remainder.7 ' The American case involved throwing fourteen passengers over-
board in order to keep the lifeboat from sinking,79 while the English case
involved killing one survivor in order to feed the other three.8 0 After being
rescued, the American officer was charged with manslaughter 8 ' and two
Englishmen were charged with murder.82 The defendants in both cases
attempted to justify the killings by invoking the necessity defense, arguing that
the circumstances allowed them no alternative to killing the victims in order to
save themselves.83 While public sentiment was highly in their favor,84 all
defendants were convicted.8 5
These cases illustrate the high premium society places on human life, and
imply that one life cannot be sacrificed to save another, even in the direst of
circumstances. 86 The English court did leave open the possibility that the kill-
ing may have been justified if the survivors drew lots to determine who would
be killed, rather than killing the youngest, weakest, and sickest member of the
crew. 87 Indeed, the American case, which had been decided over forty years
earlier, declared that if "all sustenance is exhausted, and a sacrifice of one per-
son is necessary to appease the hunger of others, the selection is by lot."
88
While there may rarely be a circumstance requiring one person's life to be
sacrificed for another, 8 9 it seems clear that in choosing the person to sacrifice,
75 For a fascinating, colorful, and detailed account of both cases, see Joseph J. Simeone,
"Survivors" of the Eternal Sea: A Short True Story, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1123 (2001).
76 Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
77 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C. E.D. Penn. 1842) (No. 15,383).
78 Id. at 361; Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 274.
" Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 361. Two women were also killed, though it is unclear whether
they threw themselves overboard voluntarily after seeing their brother tossed out, or if they
were thrown overboard after requesting that they "die the death of their brother." Their
deaths brought the total death toll to 16. Id. at n.5.
go Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 274.
81 Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 362-363.
82 Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 275.
83 Id. at 277; Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 364.
84 Public sentiment was so strong in England that a number of fundraising efforts took place
to help the defendants pay for their legal fees. English townspeople arranged a benefit night
to raise money for the accused, yacht clubs raised money, and ballads were written and sold
to contribute to the cause. Simeone, supra note 75, at 1131.
85 Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 368; Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 288.
86 The Dudley & Stephens court asked the resounding questions, "Who is to be the judge of
this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is
it to be strength, or intellect, or what?" 14 Q.B.D. at 287.
87 See Simeone, supra note 75, at 1137.
88 Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 367.
89 Given that the law considers all lives equal so that one is not better than another, it is
argued that if two men stranded at sea simultaneously reach a plank that will hold only one
of them, neither is justified in killing the other. This seems to mean certain death to both.
However, if one man reaches the plank before the other, commentators argue that he would
be justified in keeping the other man off the plank in order to preserve his own life. Such
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the selection must place all persons eligible for sacrifice on a level playing
field. 90
Fortunately, most cases invoking the necessity defense do not involve the
taking of a life,91 so such ethical debates over the greater and lesser harm are
more simplified. However, examining cases such as the shipwreck cases above
demonstrate the extraordinary difficulty in determining which of two harms
should be deemed to be the greater harm. Such inquiries involve not only ques-
tions of law, but usually questions of morality as well,92 creating an unusually
difficult job for the trier of fact who must stand in judgment of another.
5. The Threatened Harm Was Imminent
The imminence requirement is closely connected to the requirement that
no legal alternatives were available to the actor in order to avoid the potential
harm.9 3 Generally, if the threatened harm is not imminent, it is said that the
actor had sufficient time to consider legal alternatives to the criminal act.94
Consequently, failure of this element will usually negate a finding of the "lack
of legal alternatives" requirement as well.
95
Application of the imminence requirement is problematic, because if the
harm to be avoided is not imminent per se, but merely likely to happen in the
near future before alternate help can be obtained, the defense is barred.96 Some
courts have determined that a sufficient showing of imminence requires that the
defendant was forced to make a "split-second decision,"9 7 implying there was
no time to consider all available alternatives. Others refer to imminence in
terms of whether a sudden, unforeseen emergency arose. 98 In either case, the
valuations of life based on fortuity of timing are much debated. LAFAVE, supra note 26,
§ 5.4(d), at 483, 484 & n.54.
90 See id. at 484.
91 Self-defense and defense of others are in the same family as the necessity defense, and
are more typically used in cases to justify harming a person to save another. Id. § 5.4(b), at
479.
92 The English judge, in deciding the fate of Dudley and Stephens, stated that "the absolute
divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence." Dudley & Stephens, 14
Q.B.D. at 287.
93 See Martin, supra note 31, at 1568.
94 See id.; LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(d), at 485.
95 See, e.g., State v. W.M.S., 465 S.E.2d 580, 583 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (where the court
denied the necessity defense to a woman who violated a custody order to keep her child
away from an alleged sexual predator and stated in practically the same breath, "[f]irst,
appellant failed to show an imminency of sexual attack or bodily injury against the child.
Second, there was time for appellant to complain to authorities about her concerns before she
acted on her own."); State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Vt. 1979) ("Where the
hazards are long term, the danger is not imminent, because the defendants have time to
exercise options other than breaking the law.").
96 See Martin, supra note 31, at 1572.
97 See State v. Hudgins, 606 S.E.2d 443, 448 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ("It was up to the jury to
decide whether the situation involved a split-second decision in an emergency situation that
rendered defendant's actions reasonable and necessary."); Smith v. State, 874 S.W.2d 269,
273 (Tex. App. 1994) ("An 'imminent harm' occurs when there is an emergency situation,
and it is 'immediately necessary' to avoid that harm when a split-second decision is required
without time to consider the law.").
98 People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 678 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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clear directive is that without an immediately arising emergency requiring a
split-second decision, the necessity doctrine cannot be invoked.
This requirement also played a role in the shipwreck cases discussed
above. In the American case, defense counsel pointed out that under the prose-
cution's theory, the crew members were not entitled to act until the ship had
actually sunk, thereby creating the "imminent" need for action.99 The English
court, despite a jury finding that at the time of the killing the survivors had no
reasonable prospects for survival unless they fed on the victim and that they
quite probably would have died before a rescue ship found them, l0 0 nonethe-
less pointed out that there might have been a rescue ship about to appear. 0 1
The high standard of imminence precludes the defense in cases like these where
sudden, unforeseen circumstances are not present, but life-threatening situa-
tions still exist.1
0 2
6. The Defendant Was Not Responsible for Causing the Situation
This final element is sometimes added to the necessity defense to prevent
one from claiming the defense if the defendant was at fault for creating the
situation. 103 Some jurisdictions bar the defense if the defendant's intentional,
reckless, or negligent state of mind establishes culpability for the crime."
Other jurisdictions bar the defense if the actor was responsible for creating the
situation requiring a choice of evils decision, regardless of whether the fault
was intentional, negligent, or reckless. 10 5 This requirement ensures that the
defense is reserved only for those who are considered blameless in the eyes of
the law, and were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.
B. Application of the Necessity Defense
The rationale behind the necessity defense is that in some cases, society
should tolerate a violation of the criminal law when doing so achieves a greater
99 Counsel argued that the prosecution
ask[s] us to wait until the boat has sunk. We may, then, make an effort to prevent her from
sinking. They tell us to wait till all are drowned. We may, then, make endeavours to save a part.
They command us to stand still till we are all lost past possibility of redemption, and then we
may rescue as many as can be saved.
United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 364 (C.C. E.D. Penn. 1842) (No. 15,383).
100 Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 275 (1884).
101 Id. at 279.
12 In fact, in such situations, it might be the proper course for all of the men to die rather
than sacrifice another. The Dudley & Stephens court explained that although "[t]o preserve
one's life is generally speaking a duty . . . it may be the plainest and the highest duty to
sacrifice it." Id. at 287. Because some "duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of
the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others ... [i]t is not correct, therefore,
to say that there is any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve one's life." Id.
103 LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(d), at 486.
104 Id. Many jurisdictions that take this approach focus only on the recklessness or negli-
gence of the defendant, without explicitly referencing intentional acts of the defendant. This
creates a loophole where a defendant who acts intentionally in bringing about the situation
would technically be entitled to the defense. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) (1962)
(barring the defense only for negligent or reckless behavior).
105 LAFAVE , supra note 26, § 5.4(d), at 486.
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good.' °6 As one court stated, "[i]n some sense, the necessity defense allows us
to act as individual legislatures, amending a particular criminal provision or
crafting a one-time exception to it, subject to court review, when a real legisla-
ture would formally do the same under those circumstances."1 0 7 While a noble
and valid recognition, this philosophy creates some worry among members of
society because it allows predetermined laws to be disregarded by one who
deems it necessary under the circumstances.108
Consequently, the necessity defense is one of limited application."° The
prospect of evaluating the subjective nature of the defendant's proffered choice
of evils dilemma creates judicial anxiety about applying it."° Additionally, the
need for predictability and certainty in the law is eroded when the necessity
defense allows one to violate the law without punishment.' 1 ' The danger of
allowing citizens to violate laws based on the claim that it was "necessary" for
their particular cause also raises obvious fears, which have been partially
allayed by the strict elements the necessity defense requires." 2
To limit an individual's ability to invoke the necessity defense as a justifi-
cation for violating the law in pursuit of his own causes, the defense has been
disallowed in virtually all civil disobedience cases.'13 The Ninth Circuit went
so far as to declare that the necessity defense is never available in cases involv-
ing indirect civil disobedience." 4 Other courts, while not barring the defense
entirely in such cases, frequently rely on the availability of legal alternatives
and the absence of imminent harm when reaching decisions excluding necessity
as a defense to the crimes committed." 5 The Tenth Circuit summed up the
rationale behind disallowing the defense to protestors by declaring that "[t]o
allow the personal, ethical, moral, or religious beliefs of a person . . . as a
106 Id., § 5.4(a), at 477.
107 United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1992).
'O8 See V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691,
1712-1713 (2003).
109 21 AM. JUR. 2 D Criminal Law § 159, supra note 30.
110 See Nourse, supra note 108, at 1714.
1l' See Parry, supra note 40, at 452.
112 See Nourse, supra note 108, at 1712-13.
113 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S.
1104 (1995) (abortion clinic protest); United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1992)
(protest related to government actions in El Salvador); State v. LeVasseur, 613 P.2d 1328
(Haw. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980) (animal liberation); Common-
wealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993) (distribution of hypodermic needles to prevent
the spread of AIDS); People v. Craig, 585 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1991) (protest related to Ameri-
can embargo on Nicaragua); State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979) (nuclear power
plant protest).
114 Schoon, 971 F.2d at 199-200. Indirect civil disobedience indicates the defendant has
violated a law which is not in itself the object of the protest, but rather, the defendant is
merely attempting to draw attention to his cause. On the other hand, direct civil disobedi-
ence involves the violation of a law to protest the existence of the law. Id. at 196.
"' See Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State Made Me Do It: The
Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1179,
1182 (1987); William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases:
Bring in the Jury, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 3, 49, 51 (2003).
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justification for criminal activity.., would not only lead to chaos but would be
tantamount to sanctioning anarchy."'' 16
Despite the development of the necessity defense, it has never been
applied to a criminal looting charge. Before analyzing the application of the
necessity defense to a looting charge, an examination of current looting statutes
is first in order.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF LOOTING LAW AND ENFORCEMENT
A. State Looting Laws
In contrast to the development of the necessity defense in case law and
statute, the crime of looting scarcely appears. In fact, only California,1 17 Illi-
nois, 18 Louisiana," 9 Mississippi,12 o North Carolina,12 1 and South Carolina 122
have current looting statutes. Tennessee's looting statute1 2 3 was repealed in
1989. 124
While the contours of the looting statutes differ slightly, they each apply
only when there is an absence of normal security of property due to a variety of
calamities,125 or during a proclaimed state of emergency12 6 or local emer-
gency.127 Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee
enacted specific looting laws in the late 1960s in reaction to widespread race
riots. 128 California enacted its looting statute in response to the 1989 San Fran-
cisco earthquake. 129 Louisiana followed with the creation of its looting statute
in 1993.130 The enactment of these laws during volatile times indicates that
looting statutes were meant to provide additional punishments for criminals
taking advantage of natural disasters and emergency situations.
Since six states have had active looting statutes since as early as 1967,131
one might expect a breadth of case law applying the statutes to crimes commit-
116 Turner, 44 F.3d at 903.
117 CAL. PENAL CODE § 463 (West 1999).
118 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/42-1 (2003).
"1 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:62.5 (Supp. 2006).
120 Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-65 (West 1999).
121 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.6 (2003).
122 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (Supp. 2005).
123 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-324 (repealed 1989).
124 1989 TENN. PUB. ACTS, ch. 591 § 1.
125 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/42-1 ("hurricane, fire, or vis major of any kind or by virtue of a
riot, mob, or other human agency"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:62.5(A) ("hurricane, flood,
fire, act of God, or force majeure of any kind, or by virtue of a riot, mob, or other human
agency"); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-65(1) ("hurricane, fire, or vis major of any kind or by
virtue of a riot, mob, or other human agency"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.6(a) ("riot, insur-
rection, invasion, storm, fire, explosion, flood, collapse, or other disaster or calamity").
126 CAL. PENAL CODE § 463(a) (a state of emergency arises from "an earthquake, fire, flood,
riot, or other natural or manmade disaster"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-70-10(A).
127 CAL. PENAL CODE § 463(a) (a local emergency arises from "an earthquake, fire, flood,
riot, or other natural or manmade disaster").
128 See Roger D. Scott, Looting: A Proposal to Enhance the Sanction for Aggravated Prop-
erty Crime, 11 J.L. & POL. 129, 153 (1995).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Illinois was the first state to enact a looting statute through 1967 I11. Laws 2598.
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ted during various emergency situations. However, reported cases of defend-
ants prosecuted under looting statutes are incredibly sparse. In fact, there is
only one reported case of a looting acquittal,132 one reported case of a mistrial
on looting charges,' 33 and one reported case where a person was convicted of
violating a looting statute. 13 4 None invoked the necessity defense.
The one conviction occurred in People v. Flores, affirmed by an Illinois
appellate court.135 Flores entered a fire-damaged apartment, where the victim
caught him inside holding a saw, a drill, and a woman's purse and later discov-
ered that Flores was also wearing his watch. 136 Flores was charged with loot-
ing and burglary, and after a jury convicted Flores on both counts,' 3 7 he
appealed. Flores argued that the looting conviction should be vacated since it
was based on the same unlawful act as the burglary conviction, therefore the
state could not charge him with both crimes.1 38 However, the appellate court
affirmed the conviction, declaring that the act of burglary took place when Flo-
res entered the apartment, but the act of looting did not take place until Flores
exerted control over the victim's property. 139 Since the charges were based on
two separate acts, Flores could be properly convicted of both crimes.' 4 °
B. Substitute Charges for Looting
While Flores showcased that a suspect can be successfully prosecuted on
charges of both burglary and looting based on acts stemming from the same
incident, often suspects caught in situations that resemble looting are charged
only with burglary."' This is understandable in states without looting laws,
where burglary and other standard criminal charges are the only ones available
against those engaged in traditional looting.' 42 However, the lack of prosecu-
tion under looting laws is mysterious in states where the charge is available.
132 Shillington v. K-Mart Corp., 402 S.E.2d 155 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
133 State v. Short, 769 So. 2d 823 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
134 People v. Flores, 645 N.E.2d 1050 (II1. App. Ct. 1995).
135 Id.
136 id. at 1052, 1053.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1054.
139 Id. at 1059.
140 Id.
141 See People v. Thompson, 268 N.E.2d 369, 370 (Ill. 1971) (defendant found holding a
bag inside ransacked drugstore); People v. Parks, 273 N.E.2d 162, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)
(defendant found pulling clothes off racks inside a ransacked clothing store during riots);
People v. Mitchell, 268 N.E.2d 232, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (abstract opinion only) (defen-
dant found walking away with stolen property from a store during riots); People v. Glasgow,
261 N.E.2d 424, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (defendant found inside a shoe store that had been
broken into during riots, wearing a new pair of shoes from the store).
142 See United States v. Jeffries, 45 F.R.D. 119, 120 (D.D.C. 1968) ("The defendants
indicted for Burglary II ... are accused of looting the same store at about the same time.");
Virgin Islands v. Bryan, 731 F. Supp. 720, 723 (V.I. 1990) (defendant charged with grand
larceny and possession of stolen property after being investigated for "looting"); State v.
Scott, 641 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant charged with burglary after
being caught with "several items of electronic equipment ... in an area of homes reportedly
being looted"); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 407 A.2d 456, 457 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (defen-
dant charged with burglary, theft, and receiving stolen property "after the Johnstown flood of
July, 1976, [which] could be described as looting").
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The lack of case law is itself a possible reason for the failure of law
enforcement to utilize the looting statutes. 14 3 Prosecutors are generally faced
with no precedent in their own state and are uncertain how and whether other
states' minimal efforts to convict under looting laws will be considered by their
own courts.'44 Because of scarce case law, looting charges are quite suscepti-
ble to failure should clever defense counsel raise novel points of law. 145 In a
field with so little development, the risks of a failed prosecution could be great.
Burglary charges, on the other hand, are quite common and regularly
applied. 14 6 Prosecutors as well as courts are more familiar with the elements of
burglary and are probably more comfortable dealing with criminal acts under a
burglary, larceny, or other common charge that has a developed common law
history. 147 Burglary charges are also presumably easier to prove, since bur-
glary requires only the unauthorized entering of an occupied structure or build-
ing with the intent to commit a crime therein, 14 8 regardless of whether a crime
is actually committed. Looting, on the other hand, usually requires that the
offender actually damage, remove, or otherwise exert control over the victim's
property. 149 The additional work placed on prosecutors to obtain sufficient evi-
dence to prove a looting charge may act as a further incentive to rely solely on
a burglary charge.15°
Some defendants attempt to secure prosecution of a looting charge instead
of a burglary charge given the lighter sentences that looting charges sometimes
carry.' 1 This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in Illinois, the only state
with any limited case law regarding looting charges. Four 5 2 of Illinois' five 5 3
looting cases arose out of riots that occurred in Chicago during early April of
143 Scott, supra note 128, at 157.
'" See id.
145 Id.
146 See id. at 156.
147 Id. at 156-57.
148 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (1962). The common law definition of burglary consisted
of "the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the
intent to commit a felony." LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 8.13. However, states have crafted
unique definitions of burglary which have strayed from the original common law meaning,
and now the crime "contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged
entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime."
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
149 See supra notes 118-20, 122-23. California and North Carolina do not require that the
offender obtain control over any property to be guilty of looting; however, the classification
of the crime and the accompanying punishments are increased if the offender does in fact
obtain control over property. See supra notes 117, 121.
150 Scott, supra note 128, at 156.
151 For instance, Illinois classifies burglary as a class 2 felony, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/19-1(b) (West 2002), carrying a sentence of 3-7 years, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-
l(a)(5) (West 2005). However, a looting conviction in Illinois is a class 4 felony, requiring
the offender to perform community service, pay restitution, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
42-2 (West 2005), and receive a sentence of 1-3 years, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-
l(a)(7) (West 2005). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:62.2 (1997) (punishing simple bur-
glary of an inhabited dwelling with 1-12 years of hard labor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:62.5
(Supp. 2006) (punishing looters with up to fifteen years of hard labor and/or a $10,000 fine).
152 See People v. Parks, 273 N.E.2d 162 (I11. App. Ct. 1971); People v. Mitchell, 268 N.E.2d
232 (I11. App. Ct. 1971) (abstract opinion only); People v. Long, 261 N.E.2d 437 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1970); People v. Glasgow, 261 N.E.2d 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970).
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1968 in response to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.154 All of the
defendants appealed burglary convictions, arguing that they should have been
prosecuted only under the looting statute, which carried a lighter penalty.' 55
While one court declined to consider the question since the defendant did not
raise the objection with the trial court,' 5 6 the remaining three courts affirmed
the convictions, holding that burglary is an appropriate charge even if the cir-
cumstances in which the burglary takes place could also qualify the defendants
for looting charges. 157  Judicial approval of prosecutions under burglary
charges instead of looting charges may bolster prosecutors' decisions to pro-
ceed solely on burglary charges even further.
C. Police and Prosecutorial Discretion as Deterrents to Looting Charges
Another explanation for the lack of prosecution under looting laws is the
fact that the law enforcement system is vested with considerable discretion to
arrest and charge suspected criminals as officials see fit.'5 8 When police and
prosecutors choose not to utilize looting laws, the natural consequence is that
criminal looting cases will not appear before judges or juries and case law will
not develop.
Since police officers are the first line of defense against criminals, their
decisions profoundly affect whether or not a suspected criminal will be prose-
cuted.' 5 9 While police officers may not have a significant amount of discretion
to arrest,' 60 they still have limited options to not arrest a suspect. A police
"' The only Illinois case addressing looting crimes that did not arise from the 1968 riots is
People v. Flores, 645 N.E.2d 1050 (I11. App. Ct. 1995).
154 The Chicago riots resulted in approximately $10 million in property damage, 162 busi-
nesses destroyed, and eleven African-American men killed. Residents fled the Westhaven
neighborhood, which is just now beginning to redevelop after the devastation. Andrew Herr-
mann, Near West Side Will Get First New Grocery Since 1968 Riots, CHICAGO SUN TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2004, at 12.
155 Parks, 273 N.E.2d at 163; Mitchell, 268 N.E.2d at 233 (abstract opinion only); Long,
261 N.E.2d at 440; Glasgow, 261 N.E.2d at 426.
156 Glasgow, 261 N.E.2d at 427.
157 Parks, 273 N.E.2d at 164 ("[T]he coincidental presence of the riots in adjacent areas
cannot militate against strong and unrefuted evidence of burglary."); Mitchell, 268 N.E.2d at
233 (abstract opinion only); Long, 261 N.E.2d at 440 ("[W]e do not believe that it was the
intent of the legislature to frustrate and impede prosecutions for burglaries perpetrated during
periods of civil disturbance and treat burglars differently simply because lack of security
made their job easier.").
158 See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 837 (1974) (Burger, C.J. concurring) (both prose-
cutors and police have "broad discretion in enforcing the criminal laws").
159 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 13.2(b) (3d ed. 2000).
'6o Many criminal statutes contain mandatory arrest terms, requiring officers to arrest sus-
pects without regard to discretionary considerations. Id. Indeed, the Police Chief of Kenner,
Louisiana stated when asked whether his department had been bringing to the prosecutor
cases of people who stole food during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
Yes, we do. It's up to the district attorney to prosecute and prefer charges. We have a very
specific mission in the criminal justice system where we arrest people and make reports to the
district attorney based on our observations. The district attorney then makes a decision whether
he prosecutes or not.
The Abrams Report (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR
14637439.
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officer may choose not to arrest a suspect if insufficient evidence exists to
support the arrest, or if the officer does not believe the arrest would be in the
best interest of the suspect or society at large.16' Offenders who are likely to
garner jury sympathy are unlikely candidates for arrest. 162 The sheer volume
of wrongdoers may also serve as a deterrent to individual arrests, particularly
during mass rioting or looting where enacting a curfew may be the most effi-
cient way to handle violators.' 63 In states of emergency, the police force may
not have the capacity to handle a large number of wrongdoers. ' Whatever the
reason, the decision not to arrest virtually guarantees that the suspect will
escape prosecution since most of the cases brought before the prosecutor are
provided courtesy of police arrests. 165
Once an arrest is made and the case is turned over to the prosecutor, a
number of ensuing decisions determine whether the case is ultimately brought
before a judge or jury. 166 Prosecutors must first decide whether there is suffi-
cient, admissible evidence to support a conviction.' 67 Even when such evi-
dence does exist, the prosecutor may choose not to charge the suspect for any
number of reasons. 168 The most common reasons not to prosecute include the
victim's request not to pursue the charge, excessive costs of prosecution, undue
harm to the suspect, utilizing the suspect as an informant in other matters, and
the opportunity for the suspect to make full reparations without prosecution. 1 69
Discretion extends not only to decisions whether to prosecute, but also which
charges to file. 1
70
The extraordinary amount of discretion vested in prosecutors is deeply
entrenched and accepted within the American justice system. 7  Given the
161 LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 159, § 13.1(a). See also Trymaine Lee, 8th Dis-
trict: Videotaped Beating in the Quarter Batters 8th District's Image, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Dec. 18, 2005, at 1 (where a police commander stated that "[w]hen I see a
mother with her kids, under those circumstances [referring to the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina], I have to do what is morally correct... I'm not going to snatch crackers and water
out of a mother's hands.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 See Purpura, supra note 23 (where a New Orleans sheriff instructed deputies not to
arrest people taking food and survival goods after Hurricane Katrina, noting that "[ihf we
went to trial, the jury would probably find them not guilty.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
163 Scott, supra note 128, at 156.
'" See Lee, supra note 161 (where a police commander stated that, in regard to New Orle-
ans looting after Hurricane Katrina, "[wie didn't have a jail, there was nothing in place for us
in terms of holding people ... if people were trying to loot for profit, we'd make them put
the stuff down, and we'd send them away. We had no other option.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
165 LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 159, § 13.1(a).
166 Id.
167 Id. § 13.1(b).
168 Id. § 13.1(c).
169 Id. § 13.2(a).
"0 Id. § 13.1(e).
'"' Id. § 13.2(a). See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[So] long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana,
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wide latitude of discretion prosecutors possess, conditions that might give rise
to a criminal necessity defense inevitably factor into a prosecutor's decision
whether and whom to prosecute. 172 Therefore, crimes that might meet with
great public sentiment or compassion for the accused are likely candidates for
nonprosecution. 1
73
The level of discretion vested in prosecutors and its effect on criminal
charges is best illustrated in Virgin Islands v. Bryan,'74 where the defendant
sought to have charges of grand larceny and possession of stolen property
75
dismissed, alleging selective prosecution.1 76 Bryan was charged with the
crimes after allegedly taking over $1000 worth of items from a local home
improvement store in the period immediately following Hurricane Hugo.
1 7 7
Bryan, a captain of the Virgin Islands Police Department, former two-term sen-
ator, and recent gubernatorial candidate, argued that prosecutors targeted him
for prosecution because of his prominence in the community, whereas others
who "looted" the same store were not prosecuted. 178 He presented two wit-
nesses who admitted to taking items from the same store, but who were not
charged with any crimes. 179 One witness took "'a handful' of nails" worth
about one dollar, while the other witness took "two sheets of plywood and three
pieces of lumber" with an uncertain value.' 8 ° The court recognized that hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands of people had engaged in looting in the days follow-
ing the hurricane,"'8 but also reiterated that "the government is granted broad
discretion in deciding whom to prosecute."' 8 2 The court denied Bryan's
motion to dismiss, pointing to the great disparity in value of the items allegedly
taken by Bryan compared to his witnesses and also the fact that the prosecutor
had initiated several other cases based on similar looting incidents.' 83 Based
on these facts, the court concluded that the prosecutor had validly exercised
discretion in filing charges. 184
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 736
(2000).
172 See Martin, supra note 31, at 1539; LeVay, supra note 171, at 736.
173 See Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 810 (2002) ("[P]rosecutors usually will not charge sympathetic defend-
ants .... ).
174 731 F. Supp. 720 (V.I. 1990).
175 These are the standard charges brought against looters in St. Croix in the absence of
formal looting laws. See William Branigin, A Slow Recovery From "12 Hours of Terror';
Six Weeks After Striking, Hurricane Hugo Still Haunts Virgin Islands, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
1989, at Al.
176 Bryan, 731 F. Supp. at 720-721. A selective prosecution claim requires the defendant to
prove "(1) that other violators similarly situated are generally not prosecuted; (2) that the
selection of the claimant was 'intentional and purposeful'; and (3) that the selection was
pursuant to an 'arbitrary classification."' LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 159,
§ 13.4(a).
'I Bryan, 731 F. Supp. at 721.
178 Id. at 720-21.
179 Id. at 722.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 724.
182 Id. at 723.
183 Id. at 724.
184 Id.
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Bryan demonstrates not only prosecutors' discretion to prosecute only the
most severe cases, but also the practical limitations prosecutors face when
faced with mass criminal incidents.' 85 The reality of limited manpower and
limited financial resources to prosecute all wrongdoers understandably results
in the nonprosecution of "minor" looters, such as those who take just a few
items. When the few items taken are small and of little consequence, such as a
handful of nails, the inclination to prosecute subsides even further.'
86
These inherent limitations on prosecutions may explain a great deal of the
lack of case law on looting charges during disasters, riots, and states of emer-
gency. When the items taken can be reasonably identified as "necessities,"
prosecutorial discretion not to bring charges may result in the virtual nullity of
the necessity defense. 187 In this way, it can be said that prosecutorial discretion
is a tool to prosecute only those crimes that would fall outside of the generally
accepted levels of societal behavior.'8 8 This, however, presupposes that prose-
cutors validly exercise their discretionary powers in line with the will of the
people. 189
What happens in those rare cases where prosecutorial discretion does not
weed out those "minor" crimes? Given the virtually unlimited amount of dis-
cretion vested in prosecutors,' 90 the potential for abuse of that power is signifi-
cant.' 91 While we, as a community, might hope and assume that a prosecutor
would elect not to pursue charges against someone like Monica Laguard who
was "looting" to care for her children,' 9 2 what might she say to a judge if she
found herself charged with looting? Would the necessity defense be available
to explain her actions, releasing her of criminal culpability?
IV. A PROPOSAL TO MAKE THE NECESSITY DEFENSE AVAILABLE TO
INDIVIDUALS CHARGED WITH LOOTING
Currently, under Louisiana law, the necessity defense would not operate to
protect Ms. Laguard and others like her who found themselves in need of basic
items for survival after Hurricane Katrina."' Given the harsh penalties of a
looting conviction,1 94 the defense of necessity ought to expand to apply to simi-
185 Law enforcement officials elected to focus the charges on "major" looters, since "[tihere
was no way we could identify and prosecute thousands." As a result, roughly fifteen cases
were filed as a result of the St. Croix looting. Branigin, supra note 175 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
186 See id.
187 Martin, supra note 31, at 1539.
188 See LeVay, supra note 171, at 740.
189 See Martin, supra note 31, at 1539.
'9 See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
' LeVay, supra note 171, at 740.
192 Prosecutors do appear to be dropping charges against such sympathetic looters from
Hurricane Katrina, since those found with food and other necessary items "were just trying
to survive" and, therefore, the District Attorney feels they should not be charged with a
crime. Purpura, supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193 See infra section IV.A.
194 "Whoever commits the crime of looting during the existence of a state of emergency...
may be fined not less than five thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars and shall
be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than three years nor more than fifteen years without
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larly situated persons who might find themselves subject to criminal
prosecution.
A. Current Application of the Necessity Defense to Looting Charges1 9 5
Louisiana's codified necessity defense explicitly identifies seven circum-
stances that allow a defendant to invoke the defense.196 The necessity defense
only applies to: (1) public officers fulfilling their duties, (2) reasonable efforts
to make an arrest, (3) conduct that is authorized by law, (4) conduct that
equates to the reasonable discipline of a child, (5) failure to perform an affirma-
tive duty that is physically impossible, (6) crimes committed because of
another's threats of death or great bodily harm, and (7) conduct in defense of
persons or property. 19 7 The seventh circumstance, while potentially applicable
to a mother violating the law to defend her children's health, actually only
applies to circumstances where force or violence is used against another.' 9 8
While Ms. Laguard's actions do not fall into any of these enumerated cate-
gories, there is still some hope. Louisiana courts have interpreted the justifica-
tion categories as non-exclusive, allowing a court to apply the necessity defense
to any crime where it is not expressly prohibited.' 99 Despite this extension of
the necessity defense, thus far, it has only been applied in two very limited
circumstances. First, necessity is a defense to the crime of "felon in possession
of a firearm" when temporary possession of a firearm is necessary to defend
oneself against an imminent attack.2 " Second, a prison escapee can claim
necessity if he escapes to avoid imminent harm, has no time to seek help, does
not injure any innocent persons in the process of escaping, and turns himself
over to authorities once safe.2°'
In both of the limited jurisprudential necessity applications, the defendant
must prove that there were no reasonable alternatives to violating the law in
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:62.5(C)
(Supp. 2006).
"I The analysis will focus on the application of the necessity defense to looting laws in
Louisiana and Mississippi, since the issue is most critical in those states in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. However, the recommendations are certainly applicable to the remaining
four states with looting laws since the necessity defense is of such limited application and
likely would not apply to defendants charged with looting in those states.
196 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18 (1997).
197 Id.
198 The subsection authorizes the necessity defense "[w]hen the offender's conduct is in
defense of persons or of property under any of the circumstances described in Articles 19
through 22." Id. Those sections authorize the use of force against another to prevent harm
to oneself or one's property, id. § 14:19; authorize justifiable homicide, id. § 14:20; revoke
the defense where the offender is the aggressor, id. at § 14:21; and authorize the use of force
against another when defending third persons, id. § 14:22.
19 State v. Blache, 480 So. 2d 304, 308 (La. 1985) (finding that because the justification
statute applies to "any crime" based on illegal conduct, the defense could be extended to a
felon in possession of a firearm under limited circumstances); see also State v. Smith, 777
So. 2d 584, 587 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (the necessity defense "provid[es] a defense in any case
in which it is not expressly prohibited").
200 Blache, 480 So. 2d at 308.
201 State v. Boleyn, 328 So. 2d 95, 97 (La. 1976) (quoting and adopting the doctrine from
People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (Ct. App. 1974)).
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order to avoid the harm20 2 and that the threat of harm was imminent.2 0 3 There-
fore, it is reasonable to assume that if a court were inclined to extend the neces-
sity defense to one charged with looting, these same two elements would be
introduced.
These elements will prove to be a substantial barrier to Ms. Laguard's
defense, given the historical difficulty in proving them as detailed in Section II.
First, a court may assume that she had reasonable alternatives available in the
form of rescue workers and agencies assisting in providing food and shelter.2 °4
The threat of harm will probably not rise to the strict "imminent" threshold,
given the general reluctance of courts to consider theft of food as necessary
except where a person is literally starving to death °.2 5 Additionally, should a
court try to impose the requirement that she was not at fault for being in the
situation, a court could point to her failure to evacuate despite mandatory evac-
uation orders as proof that she was responsible for putting herself in the situa-
tion.20 6 In all probability, her common law defense of necessity would be just
as inapplicable as the statutory defense.2 07
If Ms. Laguard were arrested, charged, and convicted of the crime of loot-
ing, a recent addition to Louisiana's looting law would require a judge to sen-
tence her to hard labor for at least three years without possibility of probation,
202 State v. Recard, 704 So. 2d 324, 328 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (prison escape defendant must
show that there is no time or opportunity to report the threat to the authorities or that such
attempts have been futile in the past, and felon in possession of a firearm must show that he
had "no reasonable alternative but to possess the firearm").
203 Id. (prison escape defendant must show that there was a "specific threat of death, forci-
ble sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future," and felon in posses-
sion of a firearm must show that "the threat of force by another is imminent") (first emphasis
added).
204 For instance, a 73-year-old woman was arrested on looting charges when she was seen
outside a deli with some sausages. The city's police chief explained that the police depart-
ment was nearby, and if she was hungry, all she had to do was go to the police department
for help rather than stealing. The Abrams Report, supra note 160. Criminal charges against
her were filed and subsequently dropped. Paul Purpura, Sausage-Looting Case Doesn't Pan
Out, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 13, 2006, at Metro 1.
205 See LaFave, supra note 26, § 5.4(c), at 480.
206 Many people stubbornly stayed behind to endure the hurricane, failing to heed
mandatory evacuation orders. See A City Weeps, supra note 5. One woman justified her
refusal to evacuate by declaring, "[h]eck, if we can put up with Mardi Gras, we can put up
with a hurricane." Christopher Lee & Peter Whoriskey, Hurricane Bears Down on Gulf
Coast, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al. However, many had nowhere to go and no
means to leave. See Peter Whoriskey & Sam Coates, Amid the Devastation, Some Feel
Relief, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2005, at Al (highlighting the nine-hour commute to reach
safety and elderly seniors afraid to make such a journey); 'God Bless Us,' CHI. TRw., Aug.
29, 2005, at Redeye 3 (interviewing residents without cars and unable to get on an Amtrak
train); Joseph B. Treaster & Abby Goodnough, Powerful Storm Threatens Havoc Along Gulf
Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al (officials declared that at one point during the
evacuation, "more than 18,000 cars an hour were leaving the city").
207 One Louisiana state police officer declared in an interview that "[t]here actually is a
provision that looting is acceptable only if it's for things that are necessary to sustain life,
such as food and water." America's Challenge (FOX television broadcast Sept. 1, 2005)
available at 2005 WLNR 13792594. However, this exception is not included in Louisiana's
statutory defense, supra notes 196-198, and a search of Louisiana caselaw does not reveal
any such provision. In all likelihood, this approach is probably used as part of the police
discretion to determine which offenders should be arrested on charges and which to set free.
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parole, or a suspended sentence, as well as impose a possible fine ranging
between $5,000 and $10,000.208 A judge could impose a maximum penalty of
fifteen years in prison without possibility of probation, parole, or a suspended
sentence, along with the same monetary fine.2 °9 While the punishment may
seem excessive, Louisiana's judges do not seem to have any qualms imposing
the new maximum sentences on convicted looters, even those with no history
of criminal activity. 210 Although residents may consider the punishment draco-
nian and unreasonable,2 ' one judge feels such a punishment is warranted to
send a clear message that looting will not be tolerated.
2 1 2
Ms. Laguard would not fare any better if her crime had been committed in
the hurricane-ravaged state of Mississippi. Mississippi uses a common law
necessity defense, which contains three basic elements: (1) the act was done to
prevent a significant harm; (2) there were no adequate alternatives; and (3) the
harm created was not disproportionate to the harm avoided.2" 3 Mississippi also
adds the extra judicial gloss that the threatened harm was specific and immi-
nent.21 4 Recently, the state contemplated adding the requirement that the
defendant was not at fault in bringing about the harm, but declined to rule on
the matter.215 Again, Ms. Laguard will have extraordinary difficulty proving
the lack of alternatives and the imminence of harm, with the potential added
stumbling block of the "no fault" requirement should the state entertain the idea
again. At least in Mississippi, her punishment will be slightly milder, since the
judge has discretion to sentence her to imprisonment of up to fifteen years and/
or a fine up to $10,000, without mandatory minimums.2 16
208 Almost as a premonition regarding the travesty about to befall the state of Louisiana, the
governor signed into law this provision on June 29, 2005, which mandates certain punish-
ments for those who commit looting during a declared state of emergency. The provision
became effective August 15, 2005 - exactly two weeks before Hurricane Katrina hit. The
new subsection of the looting statute reads:
Whoever commits the crime of looting during the existence of a state of emergency, which has
been declared pursuant to law by the governor or the chief executive officer of any parish, when
the defendant knew or should have known that a declaration of emergency existed may be fined
not less than five thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned at
hard labor for not less than three years nor more than fifteen years without benefit of probation,
parole, or suspension of sentence.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:62.5(C) (Supp. 2006).
209 Id.
210 Three individuals, one with a clean criminal history, received the maximum sentence
from Judge Liljeberg after attempting to take twenty-seven bottles of liquor and wine, six
cases of beer, and a case of wine coolers from a local store. Paul Purpura, Looters Given 15-
Year Terms, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 29, 2006, at Metro 1 [hereinafter
Purpura, Looters Given 15-Year Sentences]. In another court, Judge Guidry threatened to
sentence defendants accused of looting a clothing store to fourteen years in prison, one year
less than the maximum, if they pled guilty to the charge. He also threatened to increase a
$50,000 bond for a single mother accused of looting when asked to reduce it. Paul Purpura,
Judge Testifies on His Looting Rulings, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 29, 2006,
at Metro 1.
211 Editorial, Be Judicious, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 3, 2006, at Metro 6.
212 Purpura, Looters Given 15-Year Sentences, supra note 210.
213 McMillan v. City of Jackson, 701 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Miss. 1997).
214 Id.
215 Stodghill v. State, 892 So. 2d 236, 239 (Miss. 2005).
216 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-65 (West 1999).
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B. Should the Necessity Defense Be Explicitly Available to Defendants
Accused of Looting?
In the wake of the mass looting following Hurricane Katrina, the ethics of
looting has been hotly debated. 1 7 Yet no one can seem to agree whether loot-
ing can ever be justified, and if so, where to draw the line regarding acceptable
211versus unacceptable looting.
Instances of looting seem never-ending in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. There were reports of people breaking into pharmacies with a forklift
to get food and water.2 19 Some took microwaves, coolers, knife sets, and foot-
ball jerseys.2 2 0 Others ransacked stores and took guns.22 ' Residents returned
home to find their televisions, stereos, and tools gone.2 2 Others found their
homes missing jewelry, computers, clothing, and bedding. 2 3 One man was
accused of taking an intriguing combination of boat batteries, a drill, antifreeze,
coffee, and 53 bottles of alcohol. 224 A New Orleans sergeant was shocked to
discover his own wedding video in a home along with other looted items.
225
Police cars were taken.226 Police officers found themselves at the other end of
the spectrum when they took items from local pharmacies, auto stores, and
hardware stores.22 7 Police officers also commandeered roughly 200 cars from
a dealership, including 41 Cadillacs. 2 8
These situations raise the question of where the fine line lies regarding
when people are willing to classify looting as acceptable or not. Most would
probably agree that taking tens of thousands of pills from a pharmacy 229 is
unacceptable because it goes beyond the realm of what can reasonably be
deemed a basic necessity of life. But what if a diabetic needed insulin during
the crisis? Would that person be justified in taking one day's supply? One
week's? One month's? Where is the line?
217 See infra notes 229-241 and accompanying text.
218 See infra notes 229-241 and accompanying text.
219 Campos & Cook, supra note 19.
220 McClam, supra note 6.
221 Roughly 1000 guns were stolen during the looting spree - 400 in Mississippi and Ala-
bama, and more than 600 in Louisiana. Michelle Hunter, 600 Firearms Looted in LA During
Hurricane Chaos, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 15, 2005, at Metro 1.
222 Hamilton, supra note 23.
223 Trymaine Lee, Ghost Patrol, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 8, 2005, at 1.
224 Christopher Drew, Courts' Slow Recovery Begins at Train Station, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2005, at A22.
225 Michael Perlstein & Trymaine Lee, Looters Continue to Prey on Storm Victims Even as
Flooded Homes are Being Rebuilt, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 22, 2006, at 1.
226 Hamilton, supra note 23.
227 William Hermann, Sheriffs Officers Lament New Orleans Police Actions, ARIZ. REPUB-
LIC (Phoenix), Sept. 7, 2005, at A5.
228 Trymaine Lee, Pair Charged With Looting Car Dealer, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Oct. 26, 2005, at Metro 1. Many police officers are still under investigation for
taking cars from the dealership, but neither the attorney general nor the district attorney have
taken action against any of the officers. The police department asserts that the vehicles were
used to replace their own flooded vehicles, and that the dealership's cars were returned, kept
"in top-notch shape," and "used with the greatest intent." Bruce Eggler & Michael Perlstein,
A Vested Interest In NOPD, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 8, 2006, at Metro 1
(internal quotation marks omitted).
229 See Hunter, supra note 1t.
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Public officials have made it clear they abhor looting, no matter the cir-
cumstances surrounding the crime. President Bush set the tone early on,
declaring a "zero tolerance" policy for all crimes committed related to the after-
math of the hurricane. 23" He felt there should be "zero tolerance [for] people
breaking the law during an emergency such as this, whether it be looting or
price gouging. 2 3 1 The White House Press Secretary defended President
Bush's position, even as it related to those taking necessities, pointing out that
supplies were being sent to the region; therefore, looting was not an acceptable
way to obtain them.23 2 Mississippi's governor echoed the President's stance
when she declared that "looting will not be tolerated, period. And the rules of
engagement will be as aggressive as the law allows.
233
Public sentiment seems a bit softer, though the feelings towards looters
vary depending on the items taken.2 34 Purdue University ethics professor Mark
Bernstein reflected the general feeling that looting can be justified when it
involves survival items, because in those circumstances, the obligations to care
for oneself and one's family take precedence over respect for another's prop-
erty rights.23 5 However, he echoed public opinion when he stated that looting
television sets and beer is "completely illegitimate. '"236 This seems to be the
moral line taken by many in evaluating which instances of looting were accept-
able,237 though it does not quantify the level of looting that would be accept-
able, or how to determine what items qualify as "survival items."
A simple debate that seems to encapsulate the argument for and against
looting was illustrated during a news broadcast weeks after the hurricane. A
viewer chastised the news anchor for condemning those who were looting
shoes, and pointed out that their behavior was justified based on the unsanitary
water that people had to walk in without knowing whether dangerous glass,
nails, metal, other hazardous items might be lurking beneath.23 8 In such a cir-
cumstance, the viewer felt that regardless of whether it might be wrong to loot,
people had to do what was necessary to protect themselves. 239 The anchor
responded that it was absurd to think that anyone would need "eleven pairs of
Nike Cross Trainers to survive the hurricane. '240 To him, such excess seemed
230 Roger Cohen, Prerogative of the Poor or a Sign of the Times?, hr'L HERALD TRIBUNE
(N.Y.), Sept. 10, 2005, at 2.
231 Id.
232 Geoffrey Nunberg, After Katrina, Language is Adrift, Too, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Sept. 11, 2005, at 3.
233 Cohen, supra note 230 (quoting Mississippi governor Haley Barbour).
234 See Mindy Fetterman, Shopping for Christmas Spirit in New Orleans, USA TODAY,
Dec. 23, 2005, at Money 1B ("When you see people looting from Saks or Brooks Bros., as
opposed to breaking in to get food or water from a hotel, it's just incredible.").
235 Cohen, supra note 230.
236 Id.
237 See Nunberg, supra note 232 (the term "looters" refers to those "who were taking what
they wanted and not simply what they needed").
238 The Situation (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 19, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR
14780611.
239 Id.
240 Id. (statement of Tucker Carlson).
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to imply sheer greed and demonstrated that people were taking advantage of the
241situation.
This exchange illuminates a valid concern regarding those who seemed to
loot excessively by taking large quantities of items that appeared unnecessary
for one person's survival. As the anchor indicated, when one person is seen
taking vast quantities of something, society considers that unjustifiable looting
because the act stems from greed, not survival needs.242
But consider a group of ten neighbors trying to survive in their small
apartment complex, who banded together to help provide for the entire
group. 243 They shared supplies they had taken from stores, including food,
water, clothes, and shoes. 2 ' Not only did their "leader," Marty Montgomery,
gather supplies245 for the group, he also kept watch over the neighborhood with
his shotgun, assisted local business owners in chasing away looters, and helped
board up shops that had been broken into.246
But again, according to the law, Mr. Montgomery is just as guilty of loot-
ing as the men he chases away from unsecured liquor stores. And if he were
seen carting away eleven pairs of Nikes, he would likely be described as one of
the "greedy" looters, despite the fact he was taking them to provide for his
small community of survivors. Facial "greediness" would probably lead to his
arrest should a police officer witness the incident. An ambitious prosecutor
might not be willing to drop charges, electing instead to pursue a criminal con-
viction carrying mandatory prison time. In that case, the proper thing for soci-
ety to do is to provide a legal defense to Mr. Montgomery, as well as Ms.
Laguard, and the others like them, who have valid explanations for their "loot-
ing." After all, harsh prison sentences and steep fines hardly seem like appro-
priate consequences for good Samaritans doing what is necessary for their own
survival and the survival of those close to them.
C. A Proposed Statutory Defense of Necessity as Applied to the Crime of
Looting
Given the broad discretion police officers and prosecutors have in charg-
ing suspected looters,14 someone like Ms. Laguard could easily find herself
facing criminal charges for taking children's clothes and food. The unclear and
unlikely application of a jurisprudential necessity defense in such situations248
probably would offer no viable defense for her, and the harsh sentencing
requirements that a looting conviction carries 24 9 would surely seem unjust. To
remedy this possible situation, looting statutes should contain explicit provi-
241 Id.
242 See id.
243 James Dao, French Quarter Becomes an Oasis of Wary Calm for Some Amid the Chaos
Nearby, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 32.
244 Id.
245 Another New Orleans resident, in defending his actions in taking food and other necessi-
ties for himself and his neighbors, said "[c]all it 'gathering supplies' . . . [jiust don't call it
looting." Id.
246 Id.
247 See supra section III.C.
248 See supra section V.A.
241 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7:182
IS LOOTING EVER JUSTIFIED?
sions allowing the necessity defense to looters under narrowly drawn
circumstances.
A viable statutory necessity defense may provide as follows:
Justifiable Looting: One shall be justified in committing the crime of looting if the
accused demonstrates the following:
1. The items looted are for basic survival needs for the duration of the emergency.
Basic survival needs include:
a. Essential food items;
b. Essential medical supplies;
c. Essential household items;
d. Essential clothing; and
e. Anything reasonably necessary for survival under the circumstances of the
emergency.
2. The items looted are taken to support oneself, one's family, and those one has
assumed some consensual responsibility for during the emergency.
3. The violator had no reasonable, legal alternatives available to obtain necessary
supplies.
A person who commits justifiable looting shall be ordered to compensate the injured
party for the items taken during the emergency.
This statutory proposal includes a number of components to ensure that
the defense is reserved for only those who are forced to loot out of pure neces-
sity, rather than those who take advantage of an opportunistic situation in the
wake of a natural disaster.
First, looting will only be justified for items that are necessary for the
duration of the emergency. This requirement recognizes that there must be an
end to the need to loot once the emergency situation has stabilized and other
resources are available. One who takes pharmacy supplies to get medicine for
an ailing family member would be justified;2 50 however, one who takes
thousands of pills from a pharmacy cannot reasonably be said to be stocking up
on medical supplies for the duration of the emergency.2 5' The durational
requirement allows for daily "shopping trips" that some looters engage in to
stock up on necessities for the day,2 52 but not the stockpiling of pills that Mr.
Dantoni and Ms. Lee took part in.253
Second, the items looted must be for basic survival needs, such as cloth-
ing, food, household needs, and medical supplies.2 54 While the model statute
250 See McClam, supra note 6 ("If the only pharmacy nearby were closed, and it had a drug
your mother needed to stay alive, breaking into the pharmacy would be the right thing to
do.").
251 As of Nov. 4, 2005, New Orleans police officers arrested fourteen people for looting
pharmacies and recovered over 58,000 pills from the offenders. Officers suspect that most
were drug dealers, and some of those arrested were also charged with drug possession with
the intent to distribute. As one official stated, "[t]here was just too much for personal con-
sumption." Hunter, supra note 11.
252 See Dao, supra note 243.
253 Supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
254 The distinction between taking survival supplies instead of frivolous items seems to
explain why several New Orleans police officers were cleared of looting charges after being
discovered taking underwear, socks, and shoes from a local Wal-Mart. A later investigation
revealed that they had received permission from their commanders to obtain the needed
items for fellow officers, and, therefore, "[tihey did not steal anything." However, they were
suspended nonetheless because "there were citizens in the store taking nonessential items
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includes a list of what would qualify as a basic survival need, it also contains an
open-ended subsection to include any item reasonably necessary under the cir-
cumstances. The law must recognize that it cannot predict one's needs during
an emergency, given the wide variety of natural disasters and states of emer-
gency that may arise without warning.255 To restrict the defense to an exclu-
sive list of food, water, clothing, household supplies, and medical supplies
would be to turn a blind eye to unpredictable needs that cannot be anticipated
and are situation-dependent. Although the reasonableness standard introduces
some uncertainty into the application of the defense, the law must recognize
that the necessity defense in general is designed to tolerate violation of the
criminal law if the offender does so to achieve a greater good, whatever that
may be.25 6 Allowing room for flexibility facilitates the underlying purpose of
the necessity defense by not excluding those with needs we cannot predict.
Third, while the items looted must be for basic survival needs, they must
also be essential under the circumstance. This requirement serves another lim-
iting function by ensuring that something that might qualify as a survival need
is not subject to justifiable looting if it will serve no purpose given the needs
during the emergency. For instance, while clothing might be a basic survival
need, taking a football jersey - which qualifies as a clothing item - is probably
not an item that would be considered essential to survival under the circum-
stances." 7 Similarly, questions might arise regarding whether an extravagant
item like foie gras would be an essential food item under the circumstance.25 8
Fourth, the defense applies only for items looted to support oneself and
those one has assumed consensual responsibility for during the emergency.
This is a necessary aspect when considering individuals like Terry Hayes and
Marty Montgomery who have taken it upon themselves to provide for friends
and neighbors suffering alongside them. However, by requiring that the sup-
port be consensual, the model statute eliminates the possibility that looters can
claim false dependents; looters would have to demonstrate that their claimed
dependents did in fact rely on them for assistance. This overall requirement
dovetails with the first requirement that the supplies be necessary for the dura-
tion of the emergency, since one taking numerous pairs of shoes will clearly not
need that many shoes for his own survival during the emergency 259 but may be
gathering supplies for his community of neighbors.
and these officers did nothing to prevent these citizens from looting." Michael Perlstein,
NOPD Clears Cops In Looting Probe, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 18, 2006,
at Al.
255 For an extensive list of looting incidents taking place in the wake of natural disasters as
well as other miscellaneous protests, grievance riots, sporting riots, and unprecipitated public
gathering riots, see Scott, supra note 128, Appendix I.
256 See LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(a), at 477.
257 See McClam, supra note 6 (describing incidents of looting, including people who took
"armfuls of football jerseys" from a sporting goods store).
258 Nunberg, supra note 232 ("You were within your rights to walk out of a supermarket
with a loaf of Wonder Bread and a jar of Skippy, but woe betide you if your bag turned out
to contain Carr's Water Crackers and a tin of foie gras.").
259 See the debate regarding excessive looting of shoes at supra notes 238-41 and accompa-
nying text. See also Perlstein, supra note 18 (reporting a looting arrest of four individuals
caught taking more than $15,000 worth of shoes from a Foot Locker).
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Fifth, the statute retains the traditional requirement that the actor did not
have legal alternatives available 2 60 However, to avoid the creativity courts
employ in crafting legal alternatives, the model statute adds the requirement
that there were no reasonable legal alternatives available. Therefore, a woman
who takes food from a deli right across the street from a police station could
not avail herself of the defense, because she could have sought assistance from
police officers who were just as accessible as the deli.26 ' Similarly, one who is
hungry and has access to a relief effort would not be justified in taking food
from a store. 2 62 But to deny the defense, a court must first find that the
offender could reasonably access such services; the mere existence of sources
of aid would not be sufficient for a court to deny the defense to an offender.
Finally, the defense contains a provision for compensation to the injured
party equal to the value of the items taken. This mirrors the requirement of
compensation included in the private necessity defense applicable to tort
actions263 and recognizes that while the offender may have looted because of
necessity, there is another injured party who must be made whole again. This
concept is exemplified in some New Orleans police officers who found them-
selves in extraordinary need of ordinary supplies like food, flashlights, and bat-
264 ofcteries. The officers took these necessary items from various stores, but
wrote down the bar codes of the items they took,265 presumably to account for
the items and repay the owners later. This requirement not only preserves the
moral code of society and the economic welfare of the unwitting "providers" of
such goods, but also serves as a check on the other requirements that items
taken be essential, necessary to survival, and in proportion to the need. After
all, if a looter knows he will be responsible for repayment, he may consider
more carefully the items he truly needs.
Noticeably absent from this proposed statutory necessity defense is the
traditional requirement that the offender was faced with imminent harm.2 66 By
restricting the statutory defense to instances where the items taken were neces-
sary for survival for the duration of the emergency, the statute employs a
broader understanding of "imminence." Rather than requiring the defendant to
be on the verge of death in order to claim the defense, the statutory remedy
allows looters to take action necessary for their continued survival amidst the
ruins of their locale. To analogize to the shipwreck cases, we do not want to
allow one to act out of necessity to save the boat only after the boat has
260 See supra section II.A.3.
261 See The Abrams Report, supra note 160.
262 See LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 5.4(d), at 485.
263 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(2) (1965) ("Where the act is for the benefit of
the actor or a third person, he is subject to liability for any harm caused by the exercise of the
privilege."). See also id. at cmt. e ("Since the actor thus avoids harm in no way threatened
by the conduct of the other, he is not entitled to commandeer the use of the other's goods for
his own protection, or that of a third person, without making good any loss thus caused.").
264 Hermann, supra note 227.
265 Id.; see also Michael Perlstein, 6th District: Uptown Cops Reclaim Tchoupitoulas Wal-
Mart and Set Up Shop, THE TiMES-I CAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 18, 2005, at I (where
New Orleans sergeant instructed officers to take what they needed from a local Wal-Mart,
but to "leave a note on the manager's door").
266 See supra section II.A.5.
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sunk.2 6 7 Society should allow individuals struggling to cope with natural disas-
ters to access whatever resources are necessary to prevent further harm.
Also absent from the proposed statute is the typical necessity requirement
that the actor not be at fault for being in the situation leading to the choice of
evils.268 Such a requirement could potentially eliminate the defense for anyone
left behind in the wake of a natural disaster, especially if officials issued a
mandatory evacuation order. Experience shows that mandatory evacuation
may not be possible 269 or practical. 27" To punish those left behind for their
lackluster evacuation plan (or optimism) 271 would simply be inequitable.
The proposed statutory necessity defense to looting charges contains sev-
eral narrow requirements, ensuring that the defense will apply to individuals
like Ms. Laguard and Mr. Montgomery, and not those individuals who loot
excessively and out of greed. Additionally, by including the defense within a
state's looting statute, the proposed defense would carve out a strict application
of the necessity defense to only the crime of looting, thus preserving the tradi-
tional elements of the necessity defense as it applies to other crimes. The
defense would apply in limited situations, only to looters, and ensures that
those who have already suffered through a traumatic event do not suffer more
at the hands of the criminal justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
Looting is traditionally a term which conjures up pictures of people thiev-
ing unnecessary items during periods of unrest and insecurity.272 However,
after hearing the reports of people "looting" food, water, and necessary survival
items during Hurricane Katrina, our perception of looters and legal justifica-
tions for their actions must be reexamined.
Currently, it appears that any allowances for looting for survival needs
exist at the graces of law enforcement officials.2 73 While we can hope that
police officers will use their discretion not to arrest "survival" looters and that
prosecutors will use their discretion not to pursue criminal charges, those
arrested and charged with looting need an explicit defense that is subject to
their own control.
After witnessing the wrath and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, society has
seen how looting sometimes serves the larger purpose of survival instead of the
traditional purpose of greed. In these cases, looters' actions should be justified,
and criminal penalties should be waived for their otherwise criminal behavior.
The proposed statutory necessity defense as applied to looting would give
those accused of looting the security of a valid defense and spare them from
criminal penalties after surviving a harrowing experience that most of us can
267 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 364 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
268 See supra section II.A.6.
269 See 'God Bless Us,' supra note 206.
270 See Whoriskey & Coates, supra note 206; Treaster & Goodnough, supra note 206.
271 See Lee & Whoriskey, supra note 206.
272 See Scott, supra note 128, Appendix I.
273 See supra section IV.A.
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only imagine. Most importantly, the defense would allow Monica Laguard to
worry about finding food and clothing for her children; not spending the next
three to fifteen years in prison as penance for her "crime."
